Washington, DC, May 30, 2023 --  

The dominance of defensive weaponry and frozen front lines in Ukraine are making modern warfare look similar to a century ago.

Six months ago, Russian forces were just a few miles east of their current positions in Bakhmut.  A high-level map of the front lines across Ukraine on November 30¹ looks hardly different from today.²  Go back over a year to just a week after the war started and the front lines look similar — Russia had already seized most of the land bridge to Crimea and much of northern Luhansk.³  The only big exception was that Russia was temporarily occupying swathes of territory between the northern  border and Kiev — territory it would quickly abandon when that offensive failed.

Over the past year, the war in Ukraine has settled in to a slog dominated by defensive weaponry and trench warfare that looks a lot like the First World War.  The kind shock and awe followed by rapid territorial gains seen in America’s last three wars, or the Blitzkrieg of the Second World War simply isn’t happening.  

Neither Russian nor Ukraine can silence the air defense systems of its rival needed to allow offensive air power to be effective.  Unmanned drones and  cruise middles are being increasingly shot town by air defense systems in both sides.  Even Russia’s “unstoppable” hypersonic missiles are falling from the sky.⁴

The same defensive advantage applies to armored columns, which were largely destroyed during the push for Kiev by Ukrainian anti-tank weapons supplied by NATO powers.  This happened again in three months ago in the town of Vuhledar. By Ukrainian accounts, 36 Russian tanks trying to break through the lines were destroyed by defensive weaponry.  This was partly corroborated by dramatic video footage.⁵

Will the same advantage of defensive weaponry block the long-awaited Ukrainian spring offensive, perhaps leading to the destruction of newly delivered Leopard tanks?  If you go simply by the track record of weaponry used in Ukraine, this appears likely.

Big territorial changes have happened just four times in the war.   The first was when Russian forces stormed across the border while Ukraine was largely unprepared,  overrunning much of southern and northeastern Ukraine.  The second was when Russia abandoned the approaches to Kiev and redeployed forces in the east.  The third was when Russia retreated from the Kharkiv area, and the fourth when it retreated from Kherson province north of the Dneiper River.  

After the initial invasion, all big territorial changes took place when Russians suddenly abandoned positions to the Ukrainians, rather than from Ukrainian forces pushing steadily forward in a Second World War-like offensive.

Ukrainian forced the retreat in Kherson  by grinding down Russian-occupied areas with artillery and attacks by special forces and  partisans.  Ultimately, the weakened and demoralized Russian forces fell back to more defensible ground rather than continue to fight.    

In Kharkiv, Ukrainians secretly massed troops then surprised poorly trained Russian forces who packed up and ran away.

If Ukraine is to be successful in moving the front lines, Ukraine must somehow scare demoralized Russian soldiers into abandoning the fight and retreating from their positions.  If Russian forces can be motivated to stand to fight as Ukraine's new tanks push against the front lines, recent history shows that defensive anti-tank weaponry is likely to prevail.

These lessons have meaning far beyond Ukraine.  Perhaps China’s jet fighters and hypersonic missiles equally vulnerable to modern anti-aircraft systems deployed on Taiwan.  Can the defensive advantages seen in Ukraine be applied to other nations who don't have Ukraine's intense combat experience?  

For the current conflict, two questions are more pressing: Are Russian forces and offensive weapons uniquely vulnerable because they are poor quality and Western defensive systems superior? Are Western-supplied tanks, missiles and planes any more survivable, at least when put up against Russian defensive arms?

With the Ukrainians widely expected to deploy NATO-supplied weaponry to change the course of the war, answers to the latter questions may come soon enough.

Related Web Columns:

Fearless Neighbors, January 24, 2023

Lessons From the Front, May 31, 2022

Notes:

1. Institute for the Study of War, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 29, 2023

2. Institute for the Study of War, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 30, 2022

3. Institute for the Study of War, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 5, 2022

4. BBC News, Ukraine War: Kyiv Says it Shot Down Russian Hypersonic Missiles, May 16, 2023

5. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, What Happened In Vuhledar? A Battle Points To Major Russian Military Problems, February 17, 2023