Washington, DC, February 4, 2025 --  

The risk of nuclear war may be higher than in the past. As horrible as that would be, it probably doesn't mean the end of the world.

Is the world on the brink of nuclear armageddon? You might think so if you believe the folks managing the "Doomsday Clock." Last week they moved it forward to "89 seconds to midnight" suggesting that the world is closer to doomsday than ever before.

This, of course is hysterical nonsense. The metaphorical clock dates to the early atomic age, when actual atomic scientists like Robert Oppenheimer and Albert Einstein created it to explain how close the world was to nuclear war. Even during the most frightening moments of the Cold War the clock was not so close to midnight. When the Soviet Union first got the bomb, the clock was set to just over two minutes to midnight, staying there right through the Cuban Missile Crisis. After easing back during the detente, heightened tensions during the Reagan years brought it to three minutes to midnight. This is where it was during NATO's 1983 Able Archer war games, which the Soviet Union mistook for actual nuclear war preparations, and nearly launched a preemptive strike.

Today's Doomsday Clock headlines say little about actual threats and more about the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists struggle for attention, relevance, and fundraising. Yet the meaningless publicity stunt provides a good opportunity to analyze the actual risks to the world from the use of nuclear weapons.

In the broadest sense, the risk of nuclear armageddon is quite low compared to during the Cold War. Yes, nationalistic politicians in Russia often make nuclear threats in response to Western support for Ukraine, this is just bombast. The idea of one country preparing a first strike of thousands of warheads to wipe out the enemy and dominate the world is thankfully a relic of the past. The risk remains of accidental launch triggered by false alarms in early warning systems combined with legacy quick-reaction retaliation policies.

While accidental nuclear war is a real and frightening possibility, it is less likely than in the 1980s, 1970s or 1960s. It is an unsolved low-probability, high-impact problem largely unchanged for generations.

Newer and more acute risks come from the rise of smaller nuclear powers. China, with the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world, was never party to many of the Cold War-era nuclear arms control and de-escalation mechanisms. China's growing nuclear arsenal is large enough to lay waste to the United States and Europe. But while it is easy to see scenarios where the United States and China come to war, this isn't any more true than war with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This growing risk should be better managed, but this is in the common interests of both China and the United States so it is likely to happen as time goes on.

Newer risks from nuclear upstarts like Pakistan, North Korea and Iran must also be considered. North Korea is the biggest wildcard, and its unstable regime is the most susceptible to hot-headed zeal or a suicidal final act if war breaks out with South Korea. The regime might nuke Seoul and deliver a few more nukes to the United States to take out a handful of cities, potentially killing millions of people and causing massive economic damage. While absolutely horrific, this would not be an existential thread to the world or even to the United States.

A similar analysis applies to Iran's nuclear program, which as we speak may be quietly moving toward a nuclear breakout. Today's Iran reels from the toppling of allies in the Middle East, and faces a possible attack from an emboldened nuclear-armed Israel and its reckless backer in the White House. The worst case scenario would see a conventional war between Israel and Iran go nuclear as Tehran detonates a prototype nuclear device against Israel, and Israel retaliates with its small but potent nuclear arsenal. While such a war would be devastating to those killed in the blasts and the economies of both countries, it would likely be condemned worldwide and be unlikely to spread beyond the Middle East.

While the risk of a nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel is heightened by the new Trump administration, the near-term risk of Russia using nuclear weapons in Ukraine is now less likely. America's pull back from arming Ukraine is awful for the Ukrainians, but it will give a desperate Russia less reason to pop a nuke on Ukraine in the near term.

For better or worse, the world today is much more complex than the bi-polar world of the Cold War era when there was a terribly high risk of nuclear annihilation. The risk of a country using a few nukes may be higher than during most years of the Cold War. But the chances of this causing a global doomsday are still much diminished.

Related Web Columns:

No Turning Back, December 24, 2024

Getting Us Nuked, June 16, 2017

Unacceptable Price, April 25, 2017